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EXTENDING INDIGENOUS RIGHTS
BY WAY OF THE AFRICAN CHARTER
Judith Murphy*
I. INTRODUCTION
Indigenous peoples make up 350 million of the world’s
population.1 While the meaning of indigeneity is contentious
for both academics and lawmakers,2 “[t]he term indigenous [is]
derived from the Latin indigena” and connotes societies with
longstanding ties to particular areas of the world.3 Ancestral
origins and traditional systems of tenure define customary
indigenous relationships with land,4 relationships that have
proven historically to be problematic. Because indigenous
peoples organize their society’s access to land communally, their
practices are not acknowledged or valued by many national
governments.5 Prevailing “[e]urocentric notions of individual
property ownership tied primarily to economic value”6 foster
Judith Murphy is a Juris Doctor candidate at Pace University School of
Law (expected May 2012). She served as the Managing Editor of the Pace
International Law Review for Volume XXIV. She is grateful for the hard
work and dedication of the journal’s staff and editorial board.
1 Michaela Pelican, Complexities of Indigeneity and Autochthony: An
African Example, 36 AFR. ETHNOLOGIST 52, 56 (2009).
2 Id.
3 Dorothy L. Hodgson, Introduction: Comparative Perspectives on the
Indigenous Rights Movement in Africa and the Americas, 104 AM.
ANTHROPOLOGIST 1037, 1038 (2002).
4 See Chairperson-Rapporteur of the Sub-Comm’n on the Promotion &
Prot. of Minorities, Standard-Setting Activities: Evolutions of Standards
Concerning the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, Comm’n on Human Rights, ¶
24, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/AC.4/1996/2 (June 10, 1996) (by Erica-Irene A.
Daes) [hereinafter Standard-Setting Activities].
5 William van Genugten, Protection of Indigenous Peoples on the African
Continent: Concepts, Position Seeking, and the Interaction of Legal Systems,
104 AM. J. INT’L L. 29, 33 (2010); see AFRICAN COMM’N ON HUMAN & PEOPLES’
RIGHTS & INT’L WORK GRP. FOR INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS, REPORT OF THE AFRICAN
COMMISSION’S WORKING GROUP OF EXPERTS ON INDIGENOUS POPULATIONS
/COMMUNITIES 21 (2005) [hereinafter REPORT OF THE AFRICAN COMMISSION’S
WORKING GROUP OF EXPERTS].
6
Lilian Aponte Miranda, Uploading the Local: Assessing the
*
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“‘[a]dherence by many states’ legal systems to [notions of]
individual property rights’”7 and contribute to a common reality
of indigenous peoples being forced off their land “to give way
for the economic interests of . . . large-scale development
initiatives that tend to destroy their lives and cultures.”8 Land
dispossession is a major source of difficulty for indigenous
peoples.9 Its implications are acute and, in recent years, there
has developed, particularly within the international legal field,
human rights discourses related to the protection of indigenous
ways of life.
This Note discusses indigeneity through the prism of the
Endorois tribe’s experiences in Kenya. The Endorois are an
indigenous group whose traditional pastoralist mode of life in
the Lake Bogoria region of Kenya’s Rift Valley10 saw profound
changes with the colonization of the British in the late 19th
century.
The colonial implementation of a legal system
anchoring property rights in the colonial Kenyan state11 had
grave implications for the Endorois, as Kenya’s post-colonial
adoption of British jurisprudential mores12 legalized the
conversion of their land for state purposes as well as their
eviction from the area surrounding Lake Bogoria.13
This Note discusses the Endorois’ endeavor to reclaim their
land through the African Commission on Human and Peoples’
Rights’ 2010 decision: Centre for Minority Rights Development
(Kenya) v. Kenya. In this case, the African Commission applied
provisions of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’
Rights and afforded the Endorois, vis-à-vis this treaty, legal
entitlement to claims of religion, property, culture, natural
Contemporary Relationship Between Indigenous Peoples’ Land Tenure
Systems and International Human Rights Law Regarding the Allocation of
Traditional Lands and Resources in Latin America, 10 OR. REV. INT’L LAW
419, 428 (2008).
7 van Genugten, supra note 5, at 33.
8 Id. at 33–34.
9 Id. at 32.
10 Cynthia Morel, Defending Human Rights in Africa: The Case for
Minority and Indigenous Rights, 1 ESSEX HUM. RTS. REV. 54, 56 (2003).
11 Korir Sing’ Oei A. & Jared Shepard, ‘In Land We Trust’: The Endorois’
Communication and the Quest for Indigenous Peoples’ Rights in Africa, 16
BUFF. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 57, 60 (2010).
12 Id.
13 Morel, supra note 10, at 56.
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resources, and development in their traditional lands.14
Part II of this Note discusses indigenous rights in the
historical context. Part III discusses indigenous rights in the
African context. Part IV discusses indigenous rights in the
Kenyan context. Part V discusses the Endorois rights’ apropos
these discussions. Finally, Part VI draws conclusions, observing that the Endorois’ case represents an extension of
developing international law related to indigenous peoples.
II. INDIGENOUS RIGHTS HISTORICALLY
A. The Doctrines of Discovery and Terra Nullis
Legal proscription of indigenous rights to land had its
nascence in colonial jurisprudence. When European sovereigns
began sending ships overseas on missions of colonization in the
fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, they adopted the Doctrine of
Discovery, a legal maxim espousing the idea that “discovering
[European] countr[ies] automatically gained sovereign and
property rights in the lands” they found.15 Discovery conferred
title to European nations and, in this respect, it meant that
Europeans overwrote patterns of tenancy in land “already
owned, occupied, and used” by native peoples.16 At first,
though “debates ensued regarding the appropriate relationship
between . . . [the colonies’ original inhabitants] and [the]
colonizing powers . . . [, ultimately, the former] were . . .
constructed as irrational, uncivilized savages”17 in European
systems of thought and, thus, became “legally irrelevant” to
European rationales of conquest.18 Because native religions did

Ctr. for Minority Rights Dev. (Kenya) v. Kenya, Commc’n No. 276/03,
Afr. Comm’n H.P.R. (Feb. 10, 2010).
15 Robert J. Miller, The Doctrine of Discovery in American Indian Law, 42
IDAHO L. REV. 1, 5 (2005); see also Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. 543, 562
(1823) (holding “[d]iscovery [to be] the original foundation of titles to land on
the American continent as between the different European nations, by whom
conquests and settlements were made.”).
16 Miller, supra note 15, at 5.
17 Miranda, supra note 6, at 425.
18 Siegfreid Wiessner, Indigenous Sovereignty: A Reassessment in Light of
the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, 41 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT’L L. 1141, 1153 (2008).
14

3

2012]

EXTENDING INDIGENOUS RIGHTS

161

not fit within Christian norms19 and because native societies
“did not resemble the contours of the territorial [European]
state, indigenous peoples were not considered [to be the proper]
subjects of . . . [the] law.”20 According to European
jurisprudence, indigenous peoples had no basis for exercising
legal authority, as the law itself was applicable only to
“civilized states,”21 colonial dominion over native lands resting
on the “legal fiction that indigenous territory was unoccupied . .
. terra nullius,”22 or vacant land.
In the African context, the Doctrine of Discovery proved
particularly egregious. Although, at the time of European
colonization, African societies were already organized into
nations defined by ethnic communities sharing common
territories, languages, cultures, and traditions,23 Africans were
construed in the European imagination to be stateless, “‘prelaw’ people[s] who were [conquerable as] morally inferior and
intellectually immature.”24 European colonial powers depicted
the African continent to be “a lawless basket case,”25 avowing
that “Africa had no history prior to direct contact with
Europe”26 in order to support “the notion that Africa was terra
nullius—a no-man’s historical and cultural wasteland ready to

19 Robert A. Williams, The Medieval and Renaissance Origins of the
Status of the American Indian in Western Legal Thought, 57 S. CAL. L. REV. 1,
12 (1999) (noting that, according to European conceptions, “[t]he State, being
of earthly origin and therefore without the ‘power to raise itself above the
insufficiency of a piece of human handiwork,’ required the authority of the
divinely willed Church ‘to acquire the divine sanction as a legitimate part of
that Human Society which God ha[d] willed.’”).
20 Miranda, supra note 6, at 426.
21 Anthony Anghie, Finding the Peripheries: Sovereignty and Colonialism
in Nineteenth-Century International Law, 40 HARV. INT’L L.J. 1, 4 (1999).
22 Patrick Macklem, Indigenous Recognition in International Law:
Theoretical Observations, 20 MICH. J. INT’L L. 177, 184 (2008).
23 Makau Wa Mutua, The Banjul Charter and the African Cultural
Fingerprint: An Evaluation of the Language of Duties, 35 VA. J. INT’L L. 339,
365 (1995).
24 Makau Mutua, Africa: Mapping the Boundaries in International Law,
104 AM. J. INT'L L. 532, 535 (2010) [hereinafter Mutua, Mapping the
Boundaries] (book review).
25 Jeremy I. Levitt, Introduction—Africa: A Maker of International Law,
in AFRICA: MAPPING NEW BOUNDARIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 1 (Jeremy I.
Levitt ed., 2008).
26 Mutua, Mapping the Boundaries, supra note 24, at 534.
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be taken over.”27 In 1884, when France, Britain, and Germany
initiated the Berlin Conference in order to soothe colonial
friction over African territorial disputes, the European
sovereigns ended up parsing out title to the continent without
reference to its indigenous inhabitants.28 African peoples, in
European law, “were too primitive to understand the concept of
sovereignty and, hence, were unable to cede it by treaty” at the
Berlin Conference.29
Legally, only pacts between European states had import
with respect to Africa.30 Citing notions of terra nullis, “the
colonial authorities in Africa bundled together all the incidents
of property and assigned them to the . . . control of the state.” 31
Under the Foreign Jurisdiction Act of 1890 in British African
territories, for example, the crown seized control over all land
whether there were native peoples on it or not.32 Colonial
“administrators [asserted] that ‘native law and custom’ was
merely a stage in the evolution of Africans societies . . . [that]
would wither away as western civilization became
progressi[vely] dominant in African social relations.”33 There
was, in European eyes, “no need to acknowledge . . . customary
[African] land tenure as a system of rights and duties.”34
Indigenous peoples were irrelevant to European schemes of law
and any claims to land they recognized were deemed legally
nonexistent and overwritten.
B. Postcolonial Mores and the United Nations Declaration on
the Rights of Indigenous Peoples
After World War II, when colonial governments all over
the world began to break up, the lack of recognition for
indigenous peoples under the law remained largely unchanged.
Id.
See Anghie, supra note 21, at 58.
29 Id.
30 Id.
31 Oei & Shepard, supra note 11, at 78.
32 See H.W.O. Okoth-Ogendo, The Tragic African Commons: A Century of
Expropriation, Suppression and Subversion, in LAND REFORM AND AGRARIAN
CHANGE IN SOUTHERN AFRICA 6 (Programme for Land & Agrarian Studies,
Occasional Paper Ser. No. 24, 2002).
33 Id. at 8.
34 Id.
27
28

5

2012]

EXTENDING INDIGENOUS RIGHTS

163

Although new discourses on human rights and selfdetermination began to appear internationally in instruments
like the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the
1966 International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural
Rights, these discourses were “focused on [the rights of]
individuals [vis-à-vis states]—in part because talk of minorities
and ethnic groups had been tarnished by Nazi ideology.”35
Overall, at the beginning of colonial independence in the 1960s,
while decolonization projects advanced the right of peoples to
shape their own realities, the concept of self-determination
“applied only to an overseas colonial territory as a whole,
irrespective of pre-colonial enclaves of indigenous peoples
existing within the colonial territories and colonizing states.”36
Legally, there was no focus on an idea of collective rights for
peoples within the territory of discrete nations.
It was not until the last three decades of the 20th century
that indigenous peoples began to receive the attention of
international lawmakers.37 In the 1960s and 1970s, after
having gained momentum from decolonization and the
proliferation of non-governmental organizations,
a great number of indigenous peoples’ organizations[] were
established at [both] national and international level[s] . . . [and
an indigenous movement was born.] The issues that fuelled the
movement ranged from broken treaties and loss of land to
discrimination, marginalization, conflict and gross violations of
human rights . . . Although most of the activities of the . . .
movement took place outside the environs of the United Nations,
. . . [i]n 1971, the U.N. Sub-Commission on the Prevention and
Protection of Minorities commissioned a study on ‘discrimination
against indigenous populations.’ 38

The study, named the Cobo Report after Jose Martinez Cobo,
the Special Rapporteur to the Sub-Commission on the Prevention
of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, took over ten years
to complete, examined the economic, social, cultural, political,
and legal circumstances that indigenous peoples faced, and
35 John R. Bowen, Should We Have a Universal Concept of 'Indigenous
Peoples' Rights?: Ethnicity and Essentialism in the Twenty-first Century, 16
ANTHROPOLOGY TODAY 12 (2000).
36 Miranda, supra note 6, at 426.
37 Macklem, supra note 22, at 198.
38 Id.
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made recommendations as to their rights to health, housing,
education, language, culture, land, politics, religion, and
equality.39
Importantly, the Cobo Report established for the first time
a working legal definition of indigenous peoples. They became:
those wh[o] have a historical continuity with pre-invasion and
pre-colonial societies that developed on their territories, consider
themselves distinct from other sectors of societies now prevailing
in those territories, . . . and are determined to preserve, develop,
and transmit to future generations their ancestral territories, a[s
well as] their ethnic identity, as the basis of their continued
existence as peoples, in accordance with their own cultural
patterns, social institutions and legal systems. 40

As a result of the Cobo Report, indigenous peoples began to
enter legal parlance and receive greater attention from
international law bodies. After reviewing the Cobo Report, the
U.N. Sub-Commission on the Prevention and Protection of
Minorities established a Working Group of its own on
indigenous peoples. For its part, the Working Group undertook
a second study on indigeneity.41 Concluding that
no single legal definition could account for the complexity and
regional variation of the concept [of indigeneity and] . . . focusing
on key factors [such as] . . . priority in time, voluntary
perpetuation of cultural distinctiveness, self-identification, and a
historic or present experience in subjugation, marginalization,
dispossession, exclusion, [and] discrimination [, the Working
Group] . . . confirmed the . . . definition [of indigeneity] that Cobo
had introduced.42

In 1993, as a result of its efforts, the Working Group sent a
first draft of what would become the United Nations
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples through the
Sub-Commission to the Commission on Human Rights.43 In
39 Id. at 199. See generally Special Rapporteur to the Sub-Comm’n on the
Prevention of Discrimination & Prot. of Minorities, Study of the Problem of
Discrimination Against Indigenous Populations, Comm’n on Human Rights,
U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1983/21/Add.4 (July 14, 1983) (by José Martínez
Cobo).
40 Standard-Setting Activities, supra note 4, ¶ 24.
41 Wiessner, supra note 18, at 1153.
42 Pelican, supra note 1, at 56.
43 Id. at 55.
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turn, the Commission revised the draft for submission to the
General Assembly.44 By 2006, the draft was accepted and, by
2007, the Declaration entered into force as a multilateral treaty
under international law.45
Sensitive to the initial Cobo Report and creating
affirmative rights for indigenous peoples in accordance with its
recommendations, the Declaration called on states to preserve
“the right of indigenous peoples to own, develop, control, and
use the lands and territories that they have traditionally
owned or otherwise occupied.”46 In addition, the Declaration
enshrined “the right of self-determination as its overarching
normative commitment.”47 The treaty’s substantive language
declares that “indigenous peoples have the right to selfdetermination [and states that, b]y virtue of th[is] right[,] they
[can] freely determine their political status and freely pursue
their economic, social and cultural development.”48 While it
was years in the making, the Declaration thus concretized a
legal recognition of indigenous peoples in ways that sharply
broke with the principles of law that initially marginalized
them.
III. INDIGENOUS RIGHTS IN THE AFRICAN CONTEXT
A. African Mores and the United Nations Declaration on the
Rights of Indigenous Peoples
Despite the positive strides of the Declaration, it was not
initially accepted with unanimity. In June of 2006, when the
finalized draft of the Declaration came before the Human
Rights Council, “it soon emerged that a group of African
states . . . took exception to some [of its] formulations.”49 The
African Group, made up of the full bloc of fifty-three African

Id.
Macklem, supra note 22, at 200.
46 Id. at 201.
47 Id. at 200.
48 United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples art. 3,
U.N. G.A. Res. 61/295, U.N. Doc. A/RES/47/1 (Sep. 13, 2007) [hereinafter
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples].
49 Pelican, supra note 1, at 55.
44
45
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Union nations,50 put together an Aide Memoire that laid out
its trepidations about the draft’s offered definition of
indigeneity and focus on self-determination rights.51 In its
Aide Memoire, the African Group took the position that any
principle of self-determination exercised by indigenous peoples
should apply only to those “‘under colonial and/or foreign
occupation.’” 52 Otherwise, it opined, the right to selfdetermination could be misinterpreted so as to justify
secession and threaten “‘the political unity and [] territorial
integrity’” of nation states.53
The African Group was not alone in its misgivings. The
African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, the
highest operating judicial body on the African continent,54
issued an Advisory Opinion on the proposed Declaration that
highlighted additional concerns. 55
In its opinion, the
Commission emphasized that when it comes to indigeneity,
rather than espouse a set legal definition, it is “much more . .
. constructive to try to bring out the main characteristics” of
indigenous peoples so as not to diminish cultural differences.
56 For its part, the African Commission defined indigeneity,
in contrast to the Cobo Report, simply. Indicating a marked
break with the proposed Declaration’s idea of indigenous
peoples, the Commission noted that it considered only “selfidentification, a special attachment to and use of . . .
traditional lands, [and] a state of marginalization” to be
legally dispositive.57
B. African Mores and the African Charter on Human and
Peoples’ Rights
The factious history of the Declaration can be explained by
Wiessner, supra note 18, at 1159.
Pelican, supra note 1, at 55.
52 African Grp., Draft Aide Memoire ¶ 3.1 (2006).
53 Id. ¶ 3.2.
54 See Christof Heyns, The African Regional Human Rights System: The
African Charter, 108 PENN ST. INT’L L. REV. 679, 685 (2004).
55 Pelican, supra note 1, at 55.
56 Advisory Op. of the Afr. Comm’n of Human & Peoples’ Rights on the
United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, Afr.
Comm’n H.P.R., ¶ 10 (2007).
57 Id. ¶ 12.
50
51

9

2012]

EXTENDING INDIGENOUS RIGHTS

167

Africa’s unique experience with indigeneity itself. In Africa,
the concept of indigeneity “differ[s] considerably from its
meaning on other continents.”58
Lengthy “histories of
conquest, assimilation, migration, and movement . . . make the
criteria for deciding who is ‘indigenous’ far murkier”59 in Africa
than elsewhere due to the fact that a “central historical feature
of [African] colonialism and decolonization was the [formation]
of an African state system established around rigid borders . . .
that had little regard to prior existing communities and
identities.”60 Today, “African societies tend to reproduce
themselves at their internal frontiers, . . . [as they are] continuously creating and re-creating a dichotomy between
original inhabitants and latecomers.” 61 Thus, many African
governments are opposed to the concept of indigeneity and
argue “that all Africans are indigenous and should have
equal” rights as such. 62
Referring to this sentiment
specifically in its Advisory Opinion, in fact, the African
Commission noted that, “in Africa, the term indigenous
populations does not mean ‘first peoples’ in reference to
aboriginality as opposed to non-African communities or those
having come from elsewhere.”63 This understanding, however,
was manifested in the Declaration’s final version only vaguely
in its preamble, which states: “the situation of indigenous
peoples varies from region to region and from country to
country.”64
As a matter of law, thus, while regard for African cultural
contexts played a great role in shaping the African reaction to
the Declaration, it also played a great role in shaping the
signing and ratification of another international treaty
pertinent to Africa: the African Charter on Human and
Peoples’ Rights. With the formation of the Organization of
African Unity in 1963, “independent African states affirmed
Pelican, supra note 1, at 56.
Hodgson, supra note 3, at 1037.
60 Dwight G. Newman, The Law and Politics of Indigenous Rights in the
Postcolonial African State, 102 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 69, 70 (2008).
61 Pelican, supra note 1, at 52–53.
62 Id. at 53.
63 Id.
64 Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, supra note 48, at
pmbl.
58
59
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their solidarity in the quest for [a] better life of the ‘African
peoples.’”65 In 1981, this solidarity was implemented through
the adoption of the African Charter.66 The Charter, which
takes “an integrated approach towards the concept of . . .
rights, enshrining [at once] . . . civil and political rights
(libertarian rights); . . . economic, social, and cultural rights
(egalitarian rights); and . . . peoples’ or group rights (solidarity
rights),”67 was passed with “‘a remarkable degree of consensus’”
on the part of African states.68 Ratified very quickly, the
African Charter entered into force only five years after its
initial drafting,69 all fifty-three member states of the African
Union becoming parties to it.70
Although Article 1 of the Charter almost forbiddingly
provides that state parties are obligated, in binding fashion, to
“recognize the rights, duties and freedoms [laid out under the
treaty] and . . . [to] undertake to adopt . . . measures to give
[them] effect,”71 African states did not withhold ratification.
Because the Charter expressly requires state parties to take
“into consideration the virtues of their historical tradition[s]
and the values of African civilization[,] which [, the treaty
emphasizes,] should inspire and characterize their reflection on
the concept of human and [p]eoples rights,”72 the Charter was,
as a whole, set up to be responsive to African contexts in its
intents and purposes.
Indeed, the Charter’s irresistible
“implication . . . is that African traditional values . . . are key to
the realization of human rights” under a concept—with
pertinence to this Note—much more broadly construed than
65 Lawrence Juma, Reconciling African Customary Law and Human
Rights in Kenya: Making a Case for Institutional Reformation and
Revitalization of Customary Adjudication Processes, 14 ST. THOMAS L. REV.
459, 486 (2002).
66 Mirna E. Adjami, African Courts, International Law, and Comparative
Case Law: Chimera or Emerging Human Rights Jurisprudence?, 24 MICH. J.
INT’L L. 103, 104 (2002).
67 Nsongurua J. Udombana, Between Promise and Performance: Revisiting States’ Obligations Under the African Human Rights Charter, 40 STAN.
J. INT’L L. 105, 112 (2004).
68 Id. at 107.
69 Id.
70 Heyns, supra note 54, at 682.
71 African [Banjul] Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights art. 1, June
27, 1981, O.A.U. Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3 Rev. 5 [hereinafter African Charter].
72 Id. at pmbl.
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that of indigenous rights alone.73 Although the term “peoples”
is nowhere defined in the African Charter, its use within its
provisions ensures that “the beneficiaries of the rights
enshrined in the [treaty] are both individuals and . . . groups,”74
namely the indigenous.75
Despite the Charter’s emphasis on African values,
however, the African Charter encompasses “a very expansive
approach [with] respect to [its own] interpretation.”76 Even as
indigenous rights are inherent under the African Charter, they
are not exclusive. Ultimately, under the treaty’s provisions,
African mores do not function independently of those espoused
internationally. Articles 60 and 61 of the Charter “‘bring the
African human rights mechanism within the positive influence
of . . . other regional human rights experiences’” because these
provisions ensure that the Charter’s legal interpretation relies
extensively on international sources of law.77 For its part,
Article 60 requires the African Commission, the judicial body
responsible for determining the treaty’s legal scope,78 to:
draw inspiration from international law on human and peoples’
rights, particularly from the provisions of various African
instruments on human and peoples’ rights, the Charter of the
United Nations, the Charter of the Organization of African
Unity, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, other
instruments adopted by the United Nations and by African
countries in the field of human and peoples’ rights as well as
from the provisions of various instruments adopted within the
Specialized Agencies of the United Nations. 79

Similarly, Article 61 requires the African Commission to:
take into consideration, as subsidiary measures to determine []
principles of law, other general or special international
conventions, laying down rules expressly recognized by member
states of the Organization of African Unity, African practices
consistent with international norms on human and people’s
Juma, supra note 65, at 478.
Udombana, supra note 67, at 124.
75 Oei & Shepard, supra note 11, at 96; see also REPORT OF
COMMISSION’S WORKING GROUP OF EXPERTS, supra note 5, at 79.
76 Heyns, supra note 54, at 688.
77 Oei & Shepard, supra note 11, at 87.
78 Heyns, supra note 54, at 693.
79 African Charter, supra note 71, art. 60.
73
74
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rights, customs generally accepted as law, general principles of
law recognized by African states as well as legal precedents and
doctrine.80

Overall, in construing the Charter, the African
Commission is bound to “accept legal arguments with the
support of appropriate and relevant international and regional
human rights instruments, principles, norms, and standards.”81
IV. INDIGENOUS RIGHTS IN THE KENYAN CONTEXT
Even as the Charter provides a highly pertinent body of
rights, like the Declaration, it was not initially met with
unanimity. Although the Charter “suggests [in Article 1] at
least a formal commitment by African [s]tates to conform their
national law and practice to international standards . . . , most
African states have fallen short of what is expected of them” in
this respect.82 Legally, the applicability of the African Charter
is determined within the African context at the domestic law
level by lingering colonial jurisprudence.83 While Africans
states with a civil law colonial heritage are generally legal
“monists [that] insist that international law and internal law
are part of the same order, [African states with a common law
colonial heritage are legal] . . . dualists [that] insist that
‘international law and internal law are two separate legal
orders, existing independently of one another.’”84 In the former
British colony of Kenya, where the Endorois tribe was
displaced from their land, the enforcement of international
treaties like the African Charter “require[s as a prerequisite]
the passing of an enabling Act of Parliament” along the lines of
Anglophone common law tradition.85 In Kenya, because such
an enabling Act was never forthcoming, British schemes of law
proved instrumental to the way in which the Charter impacted,
or rather failed to impact, indigenous groups like the Endorois.
Legally, British jurisprudence was first imposed on Kenya

Id. art. 61.
Oei & Shepard, supra note 11, at 93.
82 Udombana, supra note 67, at 107–08.
83 Adjami, supra note 66, at 110.
84 Udombana, supra note 67, at 125.
85 Juma, supra note 65, at 493.
80
81
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when the country became a protectorate in 1895.86 Kenya’s
status as a protectorate “conferred on the British . . . the power
to exercise full jurisdiction in the colony and to set up a system
Concerned particularly with
of government therein.”87
questions of land ownership, in 1915, the British passed the
Native Trust Lands Ordinances, which, taken together,
creat[ed] two separate property domains. The first regime,
‘Crown Land,’ constituted radical title over all ‘waste and
unoccupied land’ and vested it in the colonial sovereign. The
second regime, ‘Native Areas,’ vested ultimate control of all other
land actually occupied by African communities in a Native Lands
Trust Board . . . [sitting] in London.88

Under the Ordinances, British authorities exercised full
governance over Kenyan territory. Indigenous peoples had
claim to their land by trust alone, a fact that remained
unaltered even upon independence, as, after the colonial
government was dismantled, the British passed title to
indigenous reserves into the hands of local Kenyan County
Councils, which continued to implement the trust system.89
Indeed, upon independence, Kenya “embraced the political
blueprint of colonial territoriality in terms of both space and
power.”90 Though, during the independence period, Kenyan
political parties vied for different approaches to land
legislation, ultimately, the colonial model won out.
At
independence, Kenya became “a one-party state.”91 The clash
between Kenya’s political parties: the Kenya African
Democratic Party (“KADU”) and the Kenya African National
Union (“KANU”), ended with KADU’s defeat. Though KADU
advocated “for [the] restoration of pre-colonial land spheres that
ethnic groups inhabited”92 and wanted to “give Kenya’s politics
Id. at 477.
Id.
88 Oei & Shepard, supra note 11, at 61.
89 Id.
90 David M. Anderson, ‘Yours in the Struggle for Majimbo’. Nationalism
and the Party Politics of Decolonization in Kenya, 1955–64, 40 J. CONTEMP.
HIST. 547, 558 (2005).
91 Id. at 563.
92 Karuti Kanyinga, The Legacy of the White Highlands: Land Rights,
Ethnicity, and the Post-2007 Election Violence in Kenya, 27 J. CONTEMP. AFR.
STUD. 325, 329 (2009).
86
87
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a ‘tribal foundation,’”93 its policies did not make it to the
political fore. KANU, which advocated for a “federal structure of
government in which regions were responsible for administration
of land in their territories”94—and which “derided [KADU] as
[being comprised of] tribalists who opposed the broader goals of
nationalism”95—was better financed and won the preindependence elections.96
After independence, instead of facing KADU’s plans for a
Constitution creating six regions operating with their own civil
services to implement local legislation,97 Kenyan indigenous
groups, like the Endorois, faced a Constitution that mirrored the
laws left over by the British. The Kenyan Constitution read all
through the post-colonial period: “trust Land shall vest in the
county council in whose area of jurisdiction it is situated.”98 The
Constitution’s express language stated:
[e]ach county council shall hold the Trust land vested in it for the
benefit of the persons ordinarily resident on that land and shall
give effect to such rights, interests or other benefits in respect of
the land as may, under . . . African customary law . . . , be vested
in any tribe, group, family or individual: [p]rovided that no right,
interest or other benefit under African customary law shall have
effect for the purposes of this subsection so far as it is repugnant
to any written law.99

Overall, the Kenyan Constitution privileged the state’s right to
land over the community’s, as it even further allowed Kenya to
set aside and expropriate trust land as a means of serving
governmental purposes.100

Anderson, supra note 90, at 554.
Kanyinga, supra note 92, at 328.
95 Anderson, supra note 90, at 547.
96 Kanyinga, supra note 92, at 561. Moreover, KANU effectively contributed to KADU’s demise, as, after the elections, it “co-opted its leadership by
appointing some [of its members] into [its] cabinet [in order to] . . . put the
land question under the carpet.” Id.
97 Anderson, supra note 90, at 556.
98 CONSTITUTION, art. 115(1) (2009).
99 Id. art. 115(2).
100 Id. art. 118.
93
94
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V. INDIGENOUS RIGHTS OF THE ENDOROIS COMMUNITY
A. The Endorios’ Postcolonial Experience
Thrust into a disadvantageous Constitutional framework,
the Endorois experienced an increasingly unsettled
relationship to their land in the postcolonial period.
A
community comprised of roughly 400 families of Kalenjinspeaking peoples—and a sub-group of the Tugen tribe that
traditionally inhabited the Lake Bogoria region of Kenya’s Rift
Valley—the Endorois are dependent on their cattle, goat, and
sheep livestock for survival.101 Needing to graze these animals
in Lake Bogoria’s lowlands during the rainy season and in the
Monchongoi forest during the dry season in order to ensure
yearlong access to fertile pastures, medicinal salt licks, and the
lakefront for their pastoralist and religious practices,102 the
Endorois
underwent at independence a systematic
marginalization from their indigenous ways of life.
While British colonial rule vested legal control over their
land in a trust held by the local Baringo and Koibatek County
Councils,103 actual “challenges to the Endorois’ . . . rights [to
occupy] the Lake Bogoria region were made [upon] the gazetting
of the area as a game reserve” during the 1970s.104 In 1973,
Kenya removed the Endorois “from their traditional areas so
that tourists [could] enjoy game viewing without disturbance
by ‘backwards natives.’”105 Without being consulted about the
state’s decision to make their land into a protected area and
without being notified of the gazetting until after its
implementation in 1977, the Endorois were summarily evicted
from Lake Bogoria,106 displaced to a semi-arid location that was
unsuitable to support their cultural practices,107 and denied
compensation for their loss.108
After years of seeking redress and being met only with
Morel, supra note 10, at 56.
Id.
103 Oei & Shepard, supra note 11, at 62.
104 Morel, supra note 10, at 56.
105 Oei & Shepard, supra note 11, at 110.
106 Morel, supra note 10, at 56.
107 Id.
108 Oei & Shepard, supra note 11, at 57.
101
102
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“harassment, arbitrary arrests and intimidation,”109 eventually,
the Endorois brought suit to challenge the legality of their
eviction. In 2002, the Kenyan High Court at Nakuru ruled on
initial Endorois’ pleadings alleging constitutional violations
associated with the restrictive trust management of the Baringo
and Koibatek County Councils.110 In its opinion, the High
Court stated that it could not address the community’s
collective right to property. Finding (1) that there was “no
proper identity of the [Endorois] people who were affected by
the setting aside of the[ir] land;”111 and (2) that “the law does
not allow individuals to benefit from . . . a resource simply
because they happen to be born close to” it,112 the High Court
dismissed the Endorois’ case without ruling on whether any
violations had resulted from their eviction.113 Relying merely
on a statement that the Endorois had no legal claims available
to them because the Trust Land Act affirmed a constitutional
right under Kenyan law for the state to alienate land,114 the
High Court stated that “it was too late [for the Endorois] to
complain,”115 as they could not establish legal entitlement to
territory properly set aside by the government.116
In the face of the High Court’s judgment, though the
Endorois first considered an appeal, because “the sheer
inefficiency of the Kenyan court system conspired to deny
the[ir] community further national remedies . . . [, they] sought
redress [with] the African Commission” on Human and Peoples’
Rights.117 As part of Minority Rights Group International’s
legal cases program, the Endorois initiated an entirely distinct
case with an entirely distinct focus. 118
Id.
Sitetalia v. Baringo Country Council, (2002) 183 eK.L.R. 1, 2 (H.C.K.),
available at http://kenyalaw.org/CaseSearch/view_preview1.php?link=665046
31278573495228921&words=').
111 Id. at 4.
112 Id. at 5.
113 Oei & Shepard, supra note 11, at 63.
114 Ctr. for Minority Rights Dev. (Kenya) v. Kenya, Commc’n No. 276/03,
Afr. Comm’n H.P.R., ¶ 69 (Feb. 10, 2010). Compare The Trust Land Act,
(2009) Cap. 288 §§ 7–8, with CONSTITUTION, art. 117 (2009).
115 Sitetalia, 182 eK.L.R. at 4.
116 Ctr. for Minority Rights Dev. (Kenya), Commc’n No. 276/03, ¶ 12.
117 Oei & Shepard, supra note 11, at 63.
118 Morel, supra note 10, at 55.
109
110
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B. The Endorois’ Case Before the African Commission:
Preliminary Matters
In their pleadings before the African Commission, the
Endorois put aside domestic Kenyan law and raised the issue
of their eviction by way of the African Charter.119 Focusing on
the African Commission case: Social and Economic Rights
Action Centre for Economic and Social Rights v. Nigeria, which
dealt with Nigerian state actors permitting oil companies to
destroy land owned by local citizens,120 the Endorois argued
that the Charter “provides for peoples [legal claims] to retain
their rights . . . as collectives.”121 In their complaint, the
Endorois alleged that Kenya violated African Charter Articles
8, which guarantees rights to religion;122 14, which guarantees
rights to property;123 16, which guarantees rights to health;124
17, which guarantees rights to culture;125 20, which guarantees
rights to self-determination;126 21, which guarantees rights to
natural resources;127 and 22, which guarantees rights to
development,128 in displacing them from Lake Bogoria.129
Established in 1987, a year after the African Charter came
into force,130 the African Commission represented the best
possible forum before which the Endorois could bring suit.
Whereas the High Court at Nakuru examined the Endorois’
claims pursuant to domestic Kenyan law, the African
Commission did not. For “[t]he main mechanisms employed by
the Commission to fulfill its task of supervising compliance
with Charter norms,”131 are not bound by domestic law
considerations. As mentioned above, though many African
Id. at 57.
Soc. & Econ. Rights Action Ctr. for Econ. & Soc. Rights v. Nigeria,
Commc’n No. 155/96, Afr. Comm’n H.P.R., ¶ 7 (2001).
121 Ctr. for Minority Rights Dev. (Kenya), Commc’n No. 276/03, ¶ 75.
122 African Charter, supra note 71, art. 8.
123 Id. art. 14.
124 Id. art. 16.
125 Id. art. 17.
126 Id. art. 20.
127 Id. art. 21.
128 Id. art. 22.
129 Morel, supra note 10, at 57.
130 Udombana, supra note 67, at 119.
131 Heyns, supra note 54, at 693.
119
120

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol24/iss1/5

18

176

PACE INT’L LAW REV.

[Vol. XXIV:1

states, like Kenya, do not enforce the African Charter in their
national courts because they do not accept it as a source of
binding law absent implementing domestic legislation, the
African Commission has
focused on the principle of pacta sunt servanda: simply, the
principle that agreements are binding and are to be implemented
in good faith. Under this principle, an African state’s ratification
of the African Charter creates, for that state, an obligation that
demands concrete results . . . A state cannot . . . invoke the
provisions of its domestic legislation, including its [C]onstitution,
to evade its treaty obligations.132

In this respect, the Endorois prevailed at their case’s
outset: the Commission was not deterred from hearing their
claims. Although Kenya, as the respondent state, initially
tried to dismiss the Endorois’ pleadings on the grounds that
Article 56 of the African Charter establishes admissibility
requirements barring the Commission from hearing a case if
local remedies have yet not been exhausted,133 the Commission
did not find itself constrained. Despite the fact that the
Endorois did not try their case on appeal all the way through
the Kenyan legal system, the Commission noted that because
the Endorois “premised [their claims’] admissibility on two
recognized exceptions to [Article 56’s local remedies] rule: the
substantial nature of the violations and the non-existence of
‘effective, available and efficient’ remedies within the Kenyan
legal system,”134 the local remedies requirement did not apply
to their case.135
The first substantive aspect of the pleadings that the
Commission analyzed, therefore, was the Endorois’ claim to
indigenous identity itself. Unlike the Kenyan High Court, the
Commission found the Endorois to be a recognizable indigenous
group. While noting, at the outset, that “there is no universal
and unambiguous definition of the concept” of indigeneity and
that the concept of ‘peoples’ under the African Charter is

132 Udombana, supra note 67, at 126–27; see also Vienna Convention on
the Law of Treaties art. 26, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 311.
133 African Charter, supra note 71, art. 56.
134 Oei & Shepard, supra note 11, at 65.
135 Heyns, supra note 54, at 695.
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similarly indefinite,136 the Commission drew on its adopted
Report of the Working Group of Experts on Indigenous
Populations/Communities to hold that the African “notion of
‘peoples’ is closely related to collective rights”137 and that
collective rights, in turn, are an important criteria for
identifying indigenous groups, as “self-identification as a
distinct collectivity”138 is part of the internationally recognized
legal definition of indigeneity under the Cobo Report.139
In its opinion, the Commission dispelled Kenya’s argument
that indigeneity ought to be narrowly defined and that the
Endorois, as a mere Kalenjin-speaking sub-group of the Tugen
tribe, could not qualify.140 The Commission relied on the case
of Saramaka People v. Suriname, in which the Inter-American
Court of Human Rights recognized—via the American
Convention on Human Rights, which guarantees the respective
rights of all persons subject to the jurisdiction of the treaty,
without regard to national or social origin141—the collective
land rights of a tribal community, some of whose members did
not occupy the same precise history, territory, or customs of the
larger super-class of which they were a part.142 Supplementing
the Charter’s notion of ‘peoples’ with international case law,
the Commission adopted an expansive definition of indigeneity
and found the Endorois to possess legitimate claims to group
identity under the African Charter.143

136 Ctr. for Minority Rights Dev. (Kenya) v. Kenya, Commc’n No. 276/03,
Afr. Comm’n H.P.R., ¶ 147 (Feb. 10, 2010).
137 Id. ¶ 149.
138 Id. ¶ 150.
139 See id. ¶ 152.
140 Id. ¶ 145.
141 American Convention on Human Rights art. 1(1), Nov. 22, 1969, 1144
U.N.T.S. 123 [hereinafter American Convention].
142 Saramaka People v. Suriname, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 172, ¶¶
79–86 (Nov. 28, 2007).
143 Ctr. for Minority Rights Dev. (Kenya), Commc’n No. 276/03, ¶ 162.
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C. The Endorois’ Case Before the African Commission: Charter
Violations
1. Article 8: The Right to Religion
Upon acknowledging the Endorois as a recognizable
indigenous group, the Commission was free to address Kenya’s
alleged Charter violations.
The Commission started its
analysis with Article 8 and the Endorois’ claims that Kenya
violated its guarantee of the right to the “free practice of
religion”144 by expelling them from their land and religious
sites.145 Looking to the Human Rights Committee’s
interpretation of the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights (“ICCPR”)146—which states that “everyone
shall have the right to freedom of thought, conscience and
religion”147—the Commission first established that the
Endorois’ cultural practices constituted a religion under
international law.148 It relied on the Human Rights
Committee’s interpretation of the ICCPR, which holds that it
“‘protects theistic, non-theistic and atheistic beliefs,”149 as well
as its own jurisprudence in Free Legal Assistance Group v.
Zaire, which held, in the context of a case about the state
persecution of Jehovah’s Witnesses,150 that religious freedom is
associated with groups that assemble “in connection with a
belief” under the broad scope of Charter Article 8.151
In addition, the Commission relied on its own case law in
Amnesty International v. Sudan, about the state persecution of

African Charter, supra note 71, art. 8.
Ctr. for Minority Rights Dev. (Kenya), Commc’n No. 276/03, ¶ 163.
146 Id. ¶ 164.
147 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 18(1), opened
for signature Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR].
148 Ctr. for Minority Rights Dev. (Kenya), Commc’n No. 276/03, ¶ 168.
149 Id. ¶ 164; accord Human Rights Comm., General Comment No. 22, ¶
2, U.N. Doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev.1 (July 30, 1993).
150 Free Legal Assistance Grp. v. Zaire, Commc’n Nos. 25/89, 47/90,
56/91, 100/93, Afr. Comm’n H.P.R., ¶ 3 (1995).
151 Ctr. for Minority Rights Dev. (Kenya), Commc’n No. 276/03, ¶ 165; see
Free Legal Assistance Grp., Commc’n Nos. 25/89, 47/90, 56/91, 100/93, ¶ 45.
144
145
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non-Muslims,152 to hold that any government restriction on
religious practices pursuant to Article 8 must be “proportionate
to the specific need on which [it is] predicated.”153 In terms of
the Endorois, the Commission noted that Kenya did not contest
the community’s religious claims to the area around Lake
Bogoria154 and that the state’s reasons for their “complete and
total expulsion”155 from it were insufficient to show that it had
“any significant . . . interest[s] . . . [, as] allowing . . . [the
Endorois to] practice [their] religion [on the game reserve]
would not detract from [the state’s] goal of conservation or
developing the areas [of Lake Bogoria] for economic reasons.”156
Thus, in evicting the Endorois from their land, the Commission
held Kenya to be in violation of Article 8 of the African
Charter.157
2. Article 14: The Right to Property
After having ruled on the Endorois’ right to religion, the
Commission proceeded to examine Article 14 of the African
Charter and the applicability of its provision stating: “the right
to property shall be guaranteed.”158 In the face of Kenya’s
argument that the creation of the game reserve was legal
under domestic Kenyan law,159 the Commission accepted the
Endorois’ claim that “‘property rights have an autonomous
meaning under international human rights law [that]
supersede national legal definitions.”160 In its opinion, the
Commission looked to its own jurisprudence, to the cases of
Malawi African Association v. Mauritania, about the state’s
discrimination against black Mauritanian ethnic groups,161 and
152 Amnesty Int’l v. Sudan, Commc’n Nos. 48/90, 50/91, 52/91, 89/93, Afr.
Comm’n H.P.R., ¶ 76 (1999).
153 Ctr. for Minority Rights Dev. (Kenya), Commc’n No. 276/03, ¶ 172; see
Amnesty Int’l, Commc’n Nos. 48/90, 50/91, 52/91, 89/93, ¶ 80.
154 Ctr. for Minority Rights Dev. (Kenya), Commc’n No. 276/03, ¶ 167.
155 Id. ¶ 172.
156 Id. ¶ 173.
157 Id.
158 African Charter, supra note 71, art. 14.
159 See Ctr. for Minority Rights Dev. (Kenya), Commc’n No. 276/2003, ¶¶
176–77.
160 Id. ¶ 185.
161 Malawi African Ass’n v. Mauritania, Commc’n Nos. 54/91, 61/91,
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Social and Economic Rights Action Center for Economic and
Social Rights v. Nigeria, about the state’s seizure of local land
for oil development projects,162 to establish that the right to
property under Article 14 “includes not only the right to have
access to one’s property . . . , but also the right to [have]
undisturbed possession, use and control of such property.”163
Supplementing its own case law with that from the
European Court of Human Rights and the Inter-American
Court of Human Rights, the Commission drew on the cases of
Doǧan v. Turkey and Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni
Community v. Nicaragua to rule that, under international law,
even groups that are unable to produce legal title to land, such
as the villagers in the first case164 and the indigenous group in
the second case,165 have rights to property because such rights
are born out of possession alone under precepts established by
such treaties as the Protocol to the Convention on Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms166—which states that
“every natural person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of
his possessions”167—and the American Convention on Human
Rights168—which states that “everyone has the right to the use
and enjoyment of his property.”169
Indeed, focusing on indigenous case law, the Commission
went on to analyze the case of Saramaka People v. Suriname,
which discussed Suriname’s failure to recognize tribal rights to

98/93, 164/97 à 196/97, 210/98, Afr. Comm’n H.P.R., ¶ 3 (2000).
162 Soc. & Econ. Rights Action Ctr. for Econ. & Soc. Rights v. Nigeria,
Commc’n No. 155/96, Afr. Comm’n H.P.R., ¶ 6 (2001).
163 Ctr. for Minority Rights Dev. (Kenya), Commc’n No. 276/2003, ¶ 186
(expansively construing the right to property discussed in these cases). See
Malawi African Ass’n, Commc’n Nos. 54/91, 61/91, 98/93, 164/97 à 196/97,
210/98, ¶ 128; Soc. & Econ. Rights Action Ctr. for Econ. & Soc. Rights,
Commc’n No. 155/96, ¶¶ 60–62.
164 Doǧan v. Turkey, 2004-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. 231, 263.
165 Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Cmty. v. Nicaragua, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R.
(ser. C) No. 79, ¶ 151 (Aug. 31, 2001).
166 Ctr. for Minority Rights Dev. (Kenya), Commc’n No. 276/03, ¶¶ 188–
189; see Doǧan, 2004-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. at 266.
167 Protocol to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms art. 1, Mar. 20, 1952, 213 U.N.T.S. 262.
168 Ctr. for Minority Rights Dev. (Kenya), Commc’n No. 276/03, ¶ 190; see
Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Cmty., (ser. C) No. 79, ¶¶ 151, 154.
169 American Convention, supra note 141, art. 21.
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land under the American Convention,170 and held that a state’s
failure to recognize such claims “becomes a [wholesale]
violation of the ‘right to property.’”171 Based on Saramaka
People, the Commission found that the gazetting of the
Endorois’ land was “inadequate” under the African Charter
despite domestic Kenyan law.172 Noting that the United
Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples
“bestows the right of [land] ownership rather than mere access
. . . [and] ensures that indigenous peoples can engage with the
state . . . as active stakeholders rather than as passive
beneficiaries,”173 the Commission ruled: “mere access or de
facto ownership of land is not compatible with principles of
international law. Only de jure ownership can guarantee
indigenous peoples’ effective protection.”174
With respect to the right to property, the Commission also
ruled that African legal norms mandate a two-pronged test
that Kenya was required to meet before it could legally deprive
170 Saramaka People v. Suriname, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 172, ¶
3 (Nov. 28, 2007).
171 Ctr. for Minority Rights Dev. (Kenya), Commc’n No. 276/03, ¶ 192.
172 Id. ¶ 199.
173 Id. ¶ 204. See Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, supra
note 48, art. 8(2)(b) (stating that “[s]tates shall provide effective mechanisms
for prevention of, and redress for: [a]ny action which has the aim or effect of
dispossessing them of their lands, territories or resources.”); id. art. 10
(stating that “[n]o relocation shall take place without the free, prior and
informed consent of the indigenous peoples concerned and after agreement on
just and fair compensation and, where possible, with the option of return.”);
id. art. 25 (stating that “[i]ndigenous peoples have the right to maintain and
develop their political, economic and social systems or institutions, to be
secure in the enjoyment of their own means of subsistence and development,
and to engage freely in all their traditional and other economic activities.”);
id. art. 26(3) (stating that “[s]tates shall give legal recognition and protection
to th[e] lands, territories and resources [of indigenous peoples and that s]uch
recognition shall be conducted with due respect to the customs, traditions and
land tenure systems of the indigenous peoples concerned.”); id. art. 27
(stating that “[s]tates shall establish and implement, in conjunction with
indigenous peoples concerned, a fair, independent, impartial, open and
transparent process, giving due recognition to indigenous peoples’ laws,
traditions, customs and land tenure systems, to recognize and adjudicate the
rights of indigenous peoples pertaining to their lands, territories and
resources, including those which were traditionally owned or otherwise
occupied or used [and that i]ndigenous peoples shall have the right to
participate in this process.”).
174 Ctr. for Minority Rights Dev. (Kenya), Commc’n No. 276/03, ¶ 205; see
Saramaka People, (ser. C) No. 172, ¶ 110.
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the Endorois of their land.175 Holding that because Article 14
states that land encroachment must be performed “‘in the
interest of the public need . . . ’ as well as ‘in accordance with
appropriate laws,’”176 the Commission defined the ‘in the
interest of the public need’ test as a high threshold.177 Drawing
on the U.N. Sub-Commission for the Promotion and Protection
of Human Rights, which drafted a report on indigenous peoples
positing that “limitations, if any, on the right [of] indigenous
peoples to their natural resources must flow only from the most
urgent and compelling interest[s],”178 the Commission held that
limitations on the right to property under the African Charter
“should be [interpreted to be] least restrictive.”179 In the
instant case, the Commission concluded that Kenya’s were not
according its own ruling in Constitutional Rights Project v.
Nigeria, which held that a state “may not erode a right such
that the right itself becomes illusory,”180 as the right to
property became for the Endorois when they lost access to Lake
Bogoria.
Furthermore, in terms of the ‘in accordance with the law’
test, the Commission noted that two requirements are imposed
on states like Kenya with respect to appropriated land: one of
consultation and one of compensation.181 Returning to the logic
of Saramaka People, which held that the American Convention
guarantees indigenous groups the right to preserve their
customary relationships with land,182 the Commission found
that the “effective participation of the members of [indigenous]
people [in the governance of their territories must be] in
Ctr. for Minority Rights Dev. (Kenya), Commc’n No. 276/03, ¶ 211.
Id.; accord African Charter, supra note 71, art. 14 (stating that “[t]he
right to property shall be guaranteed [and that i]t may only be encroached
upon in the interest of public need or in the general interest of the
community and in accordance with the provisions of appropriate laws.”).
177 Ctr. for Minority Rights Dev. (Kenya), Commc’n No. 276/03, ¶ 212.
178 Special Rapporteur of Sub-Comm’n on the Promotion & Prot. of
Human Rights, The Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Indigenous Peoples, Comm’n on Human Rights, ¶ 48, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2
/2004/30 (July 13, 2004) (by Erica-Irene A. Daes).
179 Ctr. for Minority Rights Dev. (Kenya), Commc’n No. 276/03, ¶ 214.
180 Id. ¶ 215; accord Constitutional Rights Project v. Nigeria, Commc’n
Nos. 140/94, 141/94, 145/95, Afr. Comm’n H.P.R., ¶ 42 (1999).
181 Ctr. for Minority Rights Dev. (Kenya), Commc’n No. 276/03, ¶ 225.
182 Saramaka People v. Suriname, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 172, ¶¶
95–96 (Nov. 28, 2007).
175
176
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conformity with their customs and traditions.”183 Stating that
Kenya failed to allow the Endorois to participate in the
creation of the game reserve, the Commission relied on Article
28 of the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of
Indigenous Peoples and upheld its language affirming that
indigenous groups have the right to restitution of or
compensation for the lands they traditionally occupied or
used.184 Accordingly, the African Commission found Kenya to
be in violation of Article 14 of the African Charter.185
3. Article 17: The Right to Culture
Following its discussion of the right to property, the
African Commission next analyzed the Endorois’ claim that
Kenya denied the group cultural rights under African Charter
Article 17. Article 17 states not only that “every individual may
freely[] take part in the cultural life of his community,”186 but
that “[t]he promotion and protection of morals and traditional
values recognized by the community shall be the duty of the
State.”187 In this respect, the Commission held that the
Charter places a burden on African states to preserve the
“cultural heritage essential to [indigenous] group identity.”188
Relying on the Human Rights Committee’s statement—made
in reference to ICCPR Article 25, which affirms: “minorities
shall not be denied the right . . . to enjoy their own culture”189—
the Commission held that “culture manifests itself in many
forms, including . . . way[s] of life associated with the use of
land resources . . . in the case of indigenous peoples.”190 The
Ctr. for Minority Rights Dev. (Kenya), Commc’n No. 276/03, ¶ 227.
Id. ¶ 232; accord Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples,
supra note 48, art. 28 (stating that “[i]ndigenous peoples have the right to
redress, by means that can include restitution or, when this is not possible,
just, fair and equitable compensation, for the lands, territories and resources
which they have traditionally owned or otherwise occupied or used, and
which have been confiscated, taken, occupied, used or damaged without their
free, prior and informed consent.”).
185 Ctr. for Minority Rights Dev. (Kenya), Commc’n No. 276/03, ¶ 238.
186 African Charter, supra note 71, art. 17(2).
187 Id. art. 17(3).
188 Ctr. for Minority Rights Dev. (Kenya), Commc’n No. 276/03, ¶ 241.
189 ICCPR, supra note 147, art. 27.
190 Ctr. for Minority Rights Dev. (Kenya), Commc’n No. 276/03, ¶ 243;
accord Human Rights Comm., General Comment No. 23, ¶ 7, U.N. Doc. HRI/
183
184
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Commission then examined the Report of the Working Group
on Indigenous Populations/Communities, specifically focusing
its attention on its idea that land dispossession is a major
threat facing indigenous groups today,191 and concluded that
states like Kenya are bound under international law to
“creat[e] spaces for dominant and indigenous cultures to coexist.”192
In its opinion, the Commission ruled that Kenya had a
high duty towards the Endorois with respect to the creation of
the game reserve on their land.193 The Commission noted in
particular that Article 17 lacks a “claw-back clause,”
interpreting this fact to mean that the Charter gives African
states no leeway for failing to promote cultural rights. Indeed,
the Commission found that Kenya’s responsibility to protect
the Endorois’ culture was non-derogable and had to be
proportionate to its legitimate aims as a state.194 Explaining
the rule of proportionality, the Commission asserted that
Kenya deprived the Endorois of the right to culture because it
“denied the community access to an integrated system of
beliefs, values, norms, mores, traditions, and artifacts closely
linked”195 with Lake Bogoria despite the fact that such access
would have posed no harm to the reserve or Kenya’s economic
incentives to develop it.196 All in all, the Commission ruled
that Kenya violated Charter Article 17 by failing to adequately
protect the Endorois’ indigenous practices.197
4. Article 21: The Right to Resources
Once the Commission granted the Endorois cultural rights,
it next turned its attention to their resource rights under
Article 21 of the African Charter, which states that “all peoples
GEN/1/Rev.1 (Apr. 8, 1994).
191 See Ctr. for Minority Rights Dev. (Kenya), Commc’n No. 276/03, ¶
244; see REPORT OF THE AFRICAN COMMISSION’S WORKING GROUP OF EXPERTS,
supra note 5, at 20.
192 Ctr. for Minority Rights Dev. (Kenya), Commc’n No. 276/03, ¶ 247.
193 Id. ¶ 248.
194 Id. ¶ 249.
195 Id. ¶ 250.
196 Id. ¶ 249.
197 Id. ¶ 251.
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shall freely dispose of their wealth and natural resources.”198
Examining Kenya’s claims that the Endorois never fully lost
access to their land because revenues from the game reserve
went into financing local projects through distributions made
by the Baringo and Koibatek County Councils,199 the African
Commission drew on the case of Social and Economic Rights
Action Center for Economic and Social Rights v. Nigeria to hold
that indigenous communities have a general “right to natural
resources contained within their traditional lands”200 because
this case barred state oil drilling companies from destroying
local property for economic development initiatives under the
scope of Article 21.201
Pursuant to the supplementary authority of Saramaka
People v. Suriname—which interpreted the American
Convention’s guarantee that “everyone has the right to the use
and enjoyment of his property”202 to mean that a state is
precluded from interfering with the resources located on
indigenous land without first consulting with the indigenous
peoples and including them in benefits derived therefrom203—
the Commission emphasized that international law holds that
indigenous groups “have the [broad] right to the use and
enjoyment of the natural resources that lie on and within
the[ir] land”204 as long as these resources have some aggregate
connection to their territories as a whole.205 Referencing the
idea that Kenya had a duty not only to consult with the
Endorois about the disposal of the resources found on their
territory, but to give them a reasonable chance to participate in
any resulting benefits,206 the Commission noted that because
Kenya’s appropriation of Lake Bogoria had the composite effect
of depriving the Endorois’ of wealth associated with the region,
African Charter, supra note 71, art. 21.
Ctr. for Minority Rights Dev. (Kenya), Commc’n No. 276/03, ¶ 253.
200 Id. ¶ 255.
201 See Soc. & Econ. Rights Action Ctr. for Econ. & Soc. Rights v. Nigeria,
Commc’n No. 155/96, Afr. Comm’n H.P.R., ¶¶ 56–57 (2001).
202 American Convention, supra note 141, art. 21.
203 Saramaka People v. Suriname, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 172, ¶
155 (Nov. 28, 2007).
204 Ctr. for Minority Rights Dev. (Kenya), Commc’n No. 276/03, ¶ 257; see
Saramaka People, (ser. C) No. 172, ¶ 155.
205 See Ctr. for Minority Rights Dev. (Kenya), Commc’n No. 276/03, ¶ 266.
206 Id. ¶ 268; accord Saramaka People, (ser. C) No. 172, ¶ 155.
198
199
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Kenya was in violation of Article 21.207
5. Article 22: The Right to Development
As the final consideration of its opinion, the African
Commission considered Article 22 of the African Charter,
which affirms not only that “[a]ll peoples shall have the right to
[] economic, social and cultural development,”208 but that
“state[s] shall have the duty . . . to ensure” such right.209
Dismissing Kenya’s argument that the Endorois were given
development rights because the Baringo and Koibatek County
Councils allocated funds from the game reserve to local
community programs,210 the Commission held that the right to
development is governed by a two pronged test of constitutive
and instrumental elements.211
Noting that the right to
development, which is still emerging in international law,212
“has been posited to require the fulfillment of five main
criteria: that it must be equitable, non-discriminatory,
participatory, accountable, and transparent, with equity and
choice as important, over-arching themes,”213 the Commission
drew on the Working Group on Indigenous Populations’
statement214 that “indigenous peoples [must] not [be] coerced,
pressured or intimidated in their choice of development.”215
Examining the Report of the Working Group of Experts on
Indigenous Populations/Communities, the Commission then
207 See Ctr. for Minority Rights Dev. (Kenya), Commc’n No. 276/03, ¶¶
255, 268.
208 African Charter, supra note 71, art. 22(1).
209 Id. art. 22(2).
210 Ctr. for Minority Rights Dev. (Kenya), Commc’n No. 276/03, ¶ 274.
211 Id. ¶ 277.
212 Stephen Marks, The Human Right to Development: Between Rhetoric
and Reality, 17 HARV. HUM. RTS. REV. 137, 137 (2004).
213 Id. See generally Arjun Sengupta, Development Cooperation and the
Right to Development (Harvard School of Public Health, Working Paper No.
12, 2003).
214 Anoanella-Iulia Motoc & The Tebtebba Found., Preliminary Working
Paper on the Principle of Free, Prior, and Informed Consent of Indigenous
Peoples in Relation to Development Affecting Their Lands and Natural
Resources that Would Serve as a Framework for the Drafting of a Legal
Commentary by the Working Group on this Concept, Comm’n on Human
Rights, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/AC.4/2004/4 (July 8, 2004).
215 Ctr. for Minority Rights Dev. (Kenya), Commc’n No. 276/03, ¶ 279;
accord Motoc & The Tebtebba Found., supra note 214, ¶ 14(a).
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asserted that “its own [legal] standards state that a
[g]overnment must consult with . . . indigenous peoples . . .
when dealing with sensitive issues [such] as land.”216
In its opinion, the Commission ruled that Kenya, by
presenting the game reserve to the Endorois “as a fait
accompli,” failed to give the group a proper opportunity to have
a say in the development of their land.217 Supporting this
analysis by relying on Saramaka People v. Suriname,218 which
held, as noted above, that indigenous groups must have a role
in state plans developed for their territories,219 the Commission
ruled that “benefit sharing is key to the development process”
under international law.220 Accordingly, the Commission found
that Kenya was obligated under Charter Article 22 not only to
allow the Endorois “to reasonably share in the benefits
[accrued] as a result of [the state’s] . . . deprivation of their
right to use and enjo[y]” Lake Bogoria,221 but to ensure that
favorable conditions at Lake Bogoria were protected so that the
community could develop of its own accord there in the
future.222
VI. IMPLICATIONS OF THE ENDOROIS’ CASE
At the end of Centre for Minority Rights Development
(Kenya) v. Kenya, the African Commission found Kenya to
have violated African Charter Articles 8, 14, 17, 21, and 22
by evicting the Endorois from Lake Bogoria. Based on this
finding, the Commission urged Kenya to:
(a) [r]ecognize rights of ownership to the Endorois and [r]estitute
Endorois ancestral land[;] (b) [e]nsure that the Endorois
community has unrestricted access to Lake Bogoria and
surrounding religious sites for religious and culture rites . . . [;]
(c) [p]ay adequate compensation to the community for all loss
216 Ctr. for Minority Rights Dev. (Kenya), Commc’n No. 276/03, ¶ 281;
accord REPORT OF THE AFRICAN COMMISSION’S WORKING GROUP OF EXPERTS,
supra note 5, at 12.
217 Ctr. for Minority Rights Dev. (Kenya), Commc’n No. 276/03, ¶ 281.
218 Id. ¶ 289.
219 Saramaka People v. Suriname, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C), ¶ 155
(Nov. 28, 2007).
220 Ctr. for Minority Rights Dev. (Kenya), Commc’n No. 276/03, ¶ 295.
221 Id.
222 Id. ¶ 298.
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suffered[;] (d) [p]ay royalties to the Endorois from existing
economic activities and ensure that they benefit from
employment possibilities within the Reserve[;] (e) [g]rant
registration to the Endorois Welfare Committee[;] (f) [e]ngage in
dialogue with the Complainants for the effective implementation
of these recommendations[; and] (g) [r]eport on the
implementation of these recommendations within three months
from the notification[,]223

exhorting the state to comply broadly with its obligations
under the African Charter. Indeed, in its opinion, the
Commission held Kenya to a high standard, one far
surpassing that applicable to the Endorois under domestic
Kenyan law alone. Making full use of African Charter
Articles 60 and 61—particularly their permissive reinforcement of reliance on legal tenants established in both
African and international law224—the African Commission
engaged in expansive legal interpretation by granting the
Endorois renewed access to their land.225
While the Commission thus provided a liberal basis for
the restitution of the Endorois’ rights, however, Centre for
Minority Rights Development (Kenya) v. Kenya did not
ultimately come down without limitations. It remains the case
that the African Commission is not delegated the power to
enforce its judgments vis-à-vis the African Charter under
current law. The recommendations urged by the Commission
are not effectively binding on Kenya. Because the Commission
lacks enforcement mechanisms under the Charter, Kenya is
merely encouraged to “‘adopt measures in conformity’” with its

Id.
See African Charter, supra note 71, art. 60; id. art 61.
225 Indeed, by employing the African Charter, the African Commission
engaged in a more expansive kind of legal reasoning than that espoused
along traditional lines by the International Court of Justice (“ICJ”) under
Article 38 of the Statue of the International Court of Justice. Article 38,
which permits the ICJ to make its decisions, in ranked order, by applying: “a.
international conventions, whether general or particular, establishing rules
expressly recognized by the contesting states; b. international custom, as
evidence of a general practice accepted as law; c. the general principles of law
recognized by civilized nations; [and] d. . . . judicial decisions and the
teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of the various nations,” is
less flexible than African Charter. Statute of the International Court of
Justice art. 38, June 26, 1945, 33 U.N.T.S. 993.
223
224
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holdings;226 as a matter of law, Kenya is not necessarily bound
to carry them out.227
Despite the unbinding nature of the decision, Centre for
Minority Rights Development (Kenya) nonetheless represents a
weighty indication of the way in which indigenous rights have
advanced within international law. Through its own reliance
on international legal authority with respect to indigeneity, the
case reveals that “indigenous peoples [can] now allude to
international norms supporting . . . claims” and advancing
rights on issues extending in scope from religion to
development.228
Moreover, the Centre for Minority Rights Development
(Kenya) decision stands as a particularly salient view of
indigenous rights in a broader sense. Though the case has
been criticized for failing to explicitly extend the Endorois’
rights to land under the United Nations Declaration on the
Rights of Indigenous Peoples,229 the African Commission did
not need to rely on this treaty in order to rule in favor of the
Endorois. In construing the African Charter, the Commission
made it clear that the Endorois’ rights as indigenous peoples
are extant not because the Endorois are indigenous per se, but
because they are peoples under the broad language and scope
of the African Charter,230 a legal mechanism that is simply
flexible enough to encompass within its interpretative
framework the means for protecting indigeneity as set out
under international law.231
The indigenous, in African
jurisprudence anyway, do not need to be separately protected
in order to have legally viable claims. On purely rhetorical
grounds, therefore, Centre for Minority Rights Development
(Kenya) exemplifies a pinnacle of legal recognition for
indigenous peoples and a decisive rejection of the kind of
lawmaking that once siloed their rights.

Heyns, supra note 54, at 695.
Id.
228 Seth Korman, Comment, Indigenous Ancestral Lands and Customary
International Law, 32 HAWAII L. REV. 391, 393 (2010).
229 Oei & Shepard, supra note 11, at 58.
230 See African Charter, supra note 71, art. 19.
231 See REPORT OF THE AFRICAN COMMISSION’S WORKING GROUP OF
EXPERTS, supra note 5, at 79.
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